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Abstract Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic paradigm whereby voters de-
cide on which projects to fund. We consider PB in which voters may be asymmetric,
and they report ordinal preferences over projects. We propose proportional represen-
tation axioms for the setting and clarify how they fit into other preference aggrega-
tion settings. As a result of our study, we also discover a new solution concept that
is stronger than proportional justified representation (PJR) for approval-based multi-
winner voting.
Keywords participatory budgeting · committee selection · multi-winner voting ·
proportional representation · algorithmic fairness
JEL Classification: C70 · D61 · D71
1 Introduction
Participatory budgeting (PB) provides a grassroots and democratic approach to se-
lecting a set of public projects to fund within a given budget. It has been deployed in
several cities all over the globe (Shah, 2007). In contrast to standard political elec-
tions, PB requires consideration of the (heterogeneous) costs of projects and must
respect a budget constraint. When examining PB settings formally, standard voting
axioms and methods that ignore budget constraints and differences in each project’s
cost need to be reconsidered. In particular, it has been discussed in policy circles that
the success of PB partly depends on how well it provides representation to minori-
ties (Bhatnaga et al., 2003). We take an axiomatic approach to the issue of propor-
tional representation in PB.
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In this paper, we consider PB with weak ordinal preferences. Ordinal prefer-
ences provide a simple and natural input format whereby participants rank candidate
projects and are allowed to express indifference. A special class of ordinal prefer-
ences are dichotomous preferences (sometimes referred to as approval ballots); this
input format is used in most real-world applications of PB. However, in recent years,
some PB applications have shifted to requiring linear order inputs. For example, in
the New South Wales state of Australia, participants are asked to provide a partial
strict ranking over projects. The PB model we consider encompasses both approval
ballots and linear order inputs.
In most of the PB settings considered, the participants are assumed to have the
same weight. However, in many scenarios, symmetry may be violated. For example,
in liquid democracy or proxy voting settings, a voter could be voting on behalf of
several voters so may have much more voting weight. Similarly, asymmetric weights
may naturally arise if PB is used in settings where voters have contributed different
amounts to a collective budget. Therefore, we consider PB where voters may have
asymmetric weights.
While there is much discussion on fairness and representation issues in PB,
there is a critical need to formalize reasonable axioms to capture these goals. We
present two new axioms that relate to the proportional representation axiom, propor-
tionality for solid coalitions (PSC), advocated by Dummett for multi-winner elec-
tions (Dummett, 1984). Our axioms provide yardsticks against which existing and
new rules and algorithms can be measured. We also provide several justifications for
our new axioms.
Contributions We formalize the setting of PB with weak ordinal preferences. Previ-
ously, restricted versions of the setting such as PB with approval ballots have been
axiomatically studied before.We then propose two new axioms Inclusive PSC (IPSC)
and Comparative PSC (CPSC) that are meaningful proportional representation and
fairness axioms for PB with ordinal preferences. In contrast to previous fairness ax-
ioms for PB (Aziz et al., 2018b), both IPSC and CPSC imply exhaustiveness (no
additional candidate can be funded without exceeding the budget).
We show that an outcome satisfying Inclusive PSC is always guaranteed to ex-
ist and can be computed in polynomial time. The concept appears to be the “right”
concept for several reasons. For example, it is stronger than the local-PJR-L con-
cept proposed for PB when voters have dichotomous preferences. It is also stronger
than generalized PSC for multi-winner voting with ordinal preferences. It implies
the well-studied concept PJR for multi-winner voting when voters have dichotomous
preferences. Even for this restricted setting, it is of independent interest. To show that
there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an outcome satisfying IPSC, we
present the PB Expanding Approvals Rule (PB-EAR) algorithm.
We also show that the CPSC is equivalent to the generalised PSC axiom for multi-
winner voting with weak preferences, to Dummett’s PSC axiom for multi-winner
voting with strict preferences, and to PJR for multi-winner voting with dichotomous
preferences.
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Fig. 1 Relations between properties. An arrow from (A) to (B) denotes that (B) is more general than (A).
2 Related Work
PB with ordinal preferences can be classified across different axes. One axis con-
cerns the input format. Voters either express dichotomous preferences or general
weak or linear orders. Along another axis, either the projects are divisible or
indivisible. When the inputs are dichotomous preferences, there has been work
both for divisible (Bogomolnaia et al., 2005; Aziz et al., 2019) as well as indivis-
ible projects (Aziz et al., 2018b; Faliszewski and Talmon, 2019). When the input
concerns rankings, then there is work where the projects are divisible. (see, e.g.
Aziz and Stursberg (2014); Aziz et al. (2018c); Airiau et al. (2019)). Some of the
work is cast in the context of probabilistic voting but is mathematically equivalent
to PB for divisible projects.
To the best of our knowledge, fairness axioms for PB for discrete projects have not
been studied deeply when input preferences are general ordinal preferences. There-
fore, this paper addresses an important gap in the literature. Table 1 provides a clas-
sification of the literature.
Approval Ballots Ordinal Prefs
Divisible (e.g. Bogomolnaia et al. (2005)) (e.g. Aziz and Stursberg (2014))
Indivisible (e.g Goel et al. (2019)) This paper
Table 1 Classification of the literature on fair participatory budgeting with ordinal preferences.
Aziz et al. (2018b) and Faliszewski and Talmon (2019) focused on PB with dis-
crete projects where the input preference format is approval ballots. We show that
our general axioms have connections with proportional representation axioms pro-
posed by Aziz et al. (2018b) for the case approval-ballots. We will also show how
our approach has additional merit even for the case approval-ballots. For example, in
contrast to previously proposed axioms in (Aziz et al., 2018b), our axioms imply a
natural property called exhaustiveness.
Fluschnik et al. (2017) consider the discrete PB model and study the computa-
tional complexity of maximizing various notions of social welfare, including Nash
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social welfare. Benade` et al. (2017) study issues surrounding preference elicitation
in PB with the goal of maximizing utilitarian welfare. In their model, they also con-
sider input formats in which voters express ordinal rankings. However, their focus
is not on proportional representation. Fain et al. (2016) considered PB both for di-
visible settings as well as discrete settings. However, their focus was on cardinal
utilities. In particular, they focus on a demanding but cardinal-utility centric concept
of core fairness. Our ordinal approach caters for many settings in which voters only
express rankings over projects. Other works on cardinal utilities include (Fain et al.,
2018; Bhaskar et al., 2018). Both ordinal and cardinal utilities have their own merits.
Whereas cardinal utilities allow users to express an intensity of preferences, ordinal
preferences are typically easier to elicit and put less cognitive burden on the voters.
The paper is also related to a rapidly growing literature on multi-winner voting
(Aziz et al., 2017a; Faliszewski et al., 2017; Aziz et al., 2017b; Elkind et al., 2017;
Janson, 2016; Schulze, 2002; Tideman, 2006). PB is a strict generalization of multi-
winner voting. Our axiomatic approach is inspired by the PSC axiom in multi-winner
voting. The axiom was advocated by Dummett (1984). PSC has been referred to as
the most important requirement for proportional representation in multi-winner vot-
ing (Woodall, 1994, 1997; Tideman and Richardson, 2000; Woodall, 1994; Tideman,
1995). We dedicate a separate section to multi-winner voting because one of our
axioms gives rise to a new and interesting axiom for the restricted setting of multi-
winner voting.
3 Preliminaries
A PB setting is a tuple (N,C,%, b,w, L) where N is the set of voters, C is the set
of candidate projects (candidates), and L is the total budget limit. The function w :
C → R+ specifies the cost w(c) of each candidate c ∈ C. The function b : N → R+
specifies a voter’s budget bi for each i ∈ N. We assume that the
∑
i∈N bi = |N|. For
any set of voters S ⊆ N, we will denote
∑
i∈S bi by b(S ). Therefore b(N) = n. A
set of candidates W ⊆ C is feasible with respect to L if w(W) ≤ L. The preference
profile % specifies for each voter i ∈ N, her ordinal preference relation over C. In
the terminology of Benade` et al. (2017), the input format can be viewed as ‘rank by
value’ so that voters rank projects according to how they value them without taking
costs into account.
We write a %i b to denote that voter i values candidate a at least as much as
candidate b and use ≻i for the strict part of %i, i.e., a ≻i b if and only if a %i b
but not b %i a. Finally, ∼i denotes i’s indifference relation, i.e., a ∼i b if and only if
both a %i b and b %i a. The relation %i results in (non-empty) equivalence classes
E1
i
, E2
i
, . . . , E
mi
i
for some mi such that a ≻i a
′ if and only if a ∈ El
i
and a′ ∈ El
′
i
for
some l < l′. Often, we will use these equivalence classes to represent the preference
relation of a voter as a preference list If each equivalence is of size 1, then the pref-
erence will be a called strict preference. If for each voter, the number of equivalence
classes is at most two, the preferences are referred to as dichotomous preferences.
When the preferences of the voters are dichotomous, the voters can be seen as ap-
proving a subset of voters. In this case for each voter i ∈ N, the first equivalence class
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E1
i
is also referred to as an approval ballot, and is denoted by Ai ⊆ C. Note that in
this special case, where a voter i has dichotomous preferences, the approval set Ai
contains all information about voter i’s preference. The vector A = (A1, . . . , An) is re-
ferred to as the approval ballot profile. If a voter is indifferent between all candidates,
then voter i’s approval ballot could be interpreted to be either Ai = ∅ or Ai = C; our
results and axioms are independent of this interpretation.
Multi-winner voting can be viewed a special kind of PB in which w(c) = 1 for all
c ∈ C and bi = 1 for all i ∈ N. The budget limit L is typically denoted by committee
size k. Any setting that allows for weak preferences can be viewed as encapsulating
the corresponding setting with approval ballots. The reason is that approval ballots
can be viewed as dichotomous preferences. Figure 1 provides an overview of which
model reduces to which other model.
Definition 1 (Exhaustive outcomes) An outcomeW is said to be exhaustive w.r.t. L
if w(W) ≤ L and w(W ∪ {c}) > L for all c ∈ C\W.
Definition 2 (Maximal cost outcomes) An outcomeW is said to be a maximal cost
outcome w.r.t. L if w(W) ≤ L and w(W) ≥ w(C′) for all C′ ⊆ C.
Note that a maximal cost outcome is always exhaustive but an exhaustive outcome
need not be maximal cost. In multi-winner voting, since we only consider outcomes
that use up the budget of k, it means that all feasible outcomes are by default both
exhaustive and maximal cost.
4 Proportional Representation in PB with Ordinal Preferences
Let c(i, j) denote voter i’s j-th most preferred candidate or one such candidate if indif-
ferences are present. To attain such a candidate c(i, j) in the presence of indifferences
the following procedure can be used: (1) break all ties in voter i’s preferences tem-
porarily to get an artificial strict order and (2) identify the j-th candidate c(i, j) in the
artificial strict order.
Definition 3 (Generalised solid coalition) Suppose voters have weak preferences.
A set of voters N′ is a generalised solid coalition for a set of candidates C′ if every
voter in N′ weakly prefers every candidate in C′ at least as high as every candidate in
C\C′. That is, for all i ∈ N′ and for any c′ ∈ C′
∀c ∈ C\C′ c′ %i c.
The candidates in C′ are said to be supported by the voter set N′, and conversely the
voter set N′ is said to be supporting the candidate set C′.
If a set of voters N′ supports a set of candidates C′, we will refer to {c : ∃i ∈
N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} \ C′ as the periphery of the set of candidates C′ with respect to
voter set N′.
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4.1 Main New Concepts
We first present a concept that is similar in spirit to the PSC concept that was proposed
by Dummett (1984) for multi-winner voting for strict preferences.
Definition 4 (Comparative PSC (CPSC) for PB with general preferences)A bud-
get W satisfies Comparative PSC (CPSC) if there exists no set of voters N′ ⊆ N
such that N′ solidly supports a set of candidates C′ such that w({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i
c(i,|C
′ |)} ∩W) < b(N′)L/n and there is a subset of candidates C′′ ⊆ C′ such that
w({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W) < w(C′′) ≤ b(N′)L/n.
The intuition for CPSC is that if a set of voters N′ solidly supports a subset C′
then it may start to think that a weight Lb(N′)/n should be selected from C′ or its
periphery especially if there is enough weight present. At the very least it should not
be the case that there is a feasible subset of C′′ ⊆ C′ of weight at most b(N′)L/n but
the weight of {c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W is strictly less.
Definition 5 (Inclusion PSC for PB with general preferences) A budget W satis-
fies Inclusion PSC (IPSC) if there exists no set of voters N′ ⊆ N who have a solidly
supported set of candidatesC′ such thatw({c:∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)}∩W) < b(N′)L/n
and there exists some candidate c ∈ C′ \ ({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W) such that
w(c ∪ ({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W)) ≤ b(N′)L/n.
The intuition for IPSC is that a set of voters N′ solidly supports a subsetC′ then it
may start to think that a weight Lb(N′)/n should be selected from C′ or its periphery
especially if there is enough weight present. At the very least it should not be the case
that weight of {c :∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W does not exceed Lb(N′)/n even if some
unselected candidate in c ∈ C′ can be added to {c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W.
For both IPSC and CPSC, we avoid violation if for N′ solidly supporting candi-
dates in C′, the weight of {c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W is large enough. That is, we
only impose representation requirements for sets of voters who solidly support a set
of candidates. If, instead, representation requirements were enforced for all sets of
voters, regardless of whether they solidly supported a set of candidates, then it may
not be possible to satisfy either axiom. This observation has already been made in the
context of multi-winner voting (see, e.g. Aziz et al. (2017a)). Similarly, both axioms
focus on whether the weight {c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩ W is large enough. If we
only care about the weight ofC′∩W, then, again, it is not possible to define a fairness
concept that is guaranteed to exist for all instances.
Both IPSC and CPSC imply exhaustiveness.
Proposition 1 (CPSC and IPSC are exhaustive) Any outcome W that satisfies
CPSC or IPSC is exhaustive.
Proof. Let W be a non-exhaustive outcome. That is, there exists a candidate c∗ ∈
C\W such that w(W ∪ {c∗}) ≤ L.
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Later, in Proposition 2, we prove the stronger result that a CPSC outcome is
always a maximal cost outcome. Thus, we omit the proof that a CPSC outcome is
exhaustive.
For the sake of a contradiction, suppose thatW satisfies IPSC. The set of all voters
N solidly supports the entire candidate set C, b(N)L/n = L, and
w({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W) = w(W) < L.
Definition 5 is violated since c∗ ∈ C\({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩ W) and w(c∗ ∪
({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W)) = w(W ∪ {c∗}) ≤ b(N′)L/n = L. This is the desired
contradiction. ⊓⊔
CPSC implies the stronger maximal cost property. As will be shown within the
proof of Proposition 3, an IPSC outcome need not be a maximal cost outcome.
Proposition 2 (CPSC implies maximal cost) Any outcome W that satisfies CPSC is
a maximal cost outcome.
Proof. Suppose thatW andW′ are two distinct budgets that satisfy CPSC and assume
w(W) < w(W′) ≤ L. We prove that W cannot satisfy CPSC. The set of all voters N
is a solid coalition for the entire candidate set C. Take C′′ = W′. We have w(W′) ≤
b(N′)L/n = L and
w({c : ∃i ∈ N s.t c %i c
(i,|C|)} ∩W) = w(W) < w(C′′) = w(W′).
Thus,W does not satisfy CPSC. ⊓⊔
Proposition 3 For PB with ordinal preferences, IPSC does not imply CPSC and
CPSC does not imply IPSC.
Proof. First, we show that IPSC does not imply CPSC. Let bi ≡ 1, L = 2,C = {a, b, c}
with w(a) = w(c) = 1 and w(b) = 0.9, and suppose that voters have dichotomous
preferences:
1 : {a, b},
1 : {a},
3, 4 : {c}.
Consider the outcomeW = {c, b}. This does not satisfy CPSC since the set of voters
N′ = {1, 2} is a generalized solid coalition for C′ = {a} with
w({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W) = w({b}) = 0.9 < b(N′)L/n = 1,
and, yet, C′′ = {a} ⊆ C′ such that w(C′′) = 1. On the other hand, W satisfies IPSC.
For example, take N′ and C′ as above, there is a single candidate a ∈ C′\{c : ∃i ∈
N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩ W and w({a} ∪ {c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩ W) = w({a, b}) >
1. Thus, IPSC is not violated by the set of voters N′ and solid coalition C′. It can
similarly be shown that for all other subsets of voters and sets of solidly supported
candidates that IPSC is not violated.
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Second, we show that CPSC does not imply IPSC. Let bi ≡ 1, L = 2,C =
{a, b, c, d, y, z} with w(a) = w(y) = w(d) = 2.1,w(b) = 0.1,w(c) = 0.9,w(z) = 1.1,
and suppose that the voters’ preferences are
1 : a, {b, c}, z, d, y
2 : b, {a, d}, y, c, z
3, 4 : z, y, d, c, b, a
Consider the outcomeW = {c, z}. This does not satisfy IPSC. The set of voters N′ =
{1, 2} forms a generalized solid coalition for C′ = {a, b} and
w({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W) = w({c}) = 0.9 < b(N′)L/n = 1.
However, the candidate b ∈ C′\{c:∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)}∩W and w({b, c}) = 1 ≤= 1.
Thus, IPSC is violated. On the other hand, W satisfies CPSC. For example, take
N′ and C′ as above, there is only one subset C′′ = {b} ⊆ C′ that does not exceed
b(N′)L/n = 1. However,
w({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W) = w({c}) = 0.9 ≥ w({b}) = 0.1.
Thus, CPSC is not violated by the set of voters N′ and solid coalition C′. It can
similarly be shown that for all other subsets of voters and sets of solidly supported
candidates that CPSC is not violated. ⊓⊔
4.2 Concepts with Approval Ballots
Proposition 4 (Comparative PSC (CPSC) for PB with approval preferences)
Suppose voters have dichotomous preferences. An outcome W satisfies Comparative
PSC (CPSC) if and only if
(i) there exists no set of voters N′ ⊆ N such that there is a subset of candidates
C′′ ⊆
⋂
i∈N′ Ai such that w(C
′′) ≤ b(N′)L/n but w(W ∩
⋃
i∈N′ Ai) < w(C
′′).
(ii) the outcome W is a maximal cost outcome.
Proof. (⇒) We prove the result via the contrapositive. Suppose that an outcome W
does not (simultaneously) satisfy (i) and (ii). If (ii) does not hold, then, by Proposi-
tion 2, CPSC does not hold. Now, suppose that (ii) holds but (i) does not. That is,
W is maximal cost and there exists N′ such that there exists C′′ ⊆
⋂
i∈N′ Ai with
w(C′′) ≤ b(N′)L/n and
w(W ∩ ∪i∈N′Ai) < w(C
′′). (1)
Since C′′ ⊆
⋂
i∈N′ Ai, the set of voters N
′ forms a generalized solid coalition for C′′
and
{c : c %i c
(i,|C′′ |)} = Ai for all i ∈ N
′. (2)
Further, the (trivial) subset C′′ is such that w(C′′) ≤ b(N′)L/n and
w({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′′ |)} ∩W) = w(∪i∈N′Ai ∩W) < w(C
′′),
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by (1). Thus, CPSC is violated.
(⇐) We prove the result via the contrapositive. Suppose that W does not satisfy
CPSC. IfW is not maximal cost, then (ii) is violated and we are done. Assume thatW
is maximal cost but does not satisfy CPSC. That is,W is maximal cost and there exists
a set of voters N′ that solidly supports C′ such that C′′ ⊆ C′ and w(C′′) ≤ b(N′)L/n
but
w({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W) < w(C′′). (3)
Now, suppose that, for some i ∈ N′,
{c : c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} , Ai.
This can only occur if |C′| > |Ai| or |Ai| = 0. In both cases, this implies that {c : c %i
c(i,|C
′ |)} = C and
w({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W) = w(C ∩W) = w(W).
But this is a contradiction since, combined with (3), this shows that W cannot be a
maximal cost outcome. Thus, it must be that, for all i ∈ N′,
{c : c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} = Ai,
and the solidly supported candidate set C′ is a subset of
⋂
i∈N′ Ai. It follows that
C′′ ⊆ C′ is also a subset of
⋂
i∈N′ Ai such that w(C
′′) ≤ b(N′)L/n and
w({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W) = w(W ∩ ∪i∈N′Ai) < w(C
′′),
by (3). Thus, (ii) is violated; this completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Proposition 5 (Inclusion PSC for PB with approval preferences) Suppose voters
have dichotomous preferences. An outcome W satisfies Inclusion PSC (IPSC) if and
only if
(i) there exists no set of voters N′ ⊆ N such that w(∪i∈N′Ai ∩ W) < b(N
′)L/n and
there exists some c ∈ (∩i∈N′Ai) \ (∪i∈N′Ai ∩W) such that w({c} ∪ (∪i∈N′Ai ∩W)) ≤
b(N′)L/n.
(ii) the outcome W is exhaustive.
Proof. (⇒) We prove the result using the contrapositive. If (ii) does not hold, then,
by Proposition 1, we see that IPSC is violated. Now, assume that (ii) holds but (i)
does not hold. That is, W is an exhaustive outcome, and there exists a set of voters
N′ ⊆ N with
w(∪i∈N′Ai ∩W) < b(N
′)L/n (4)
and some c∗ ∈ (∩i∈N′Ai) \ (∪i∈N′Ai ∩W) such that
w({c∗} ∪ (∪i∈N′Ai ∩W)) ≤ b(N
′)L/n. (5)
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Let C′ =
⋂
i∈N′ Ai. The set C
′ is solidly supported by the set of voters N′ and,
since |C′| ≤ |Ai| for all i ∈ N
′, we have
{c : s.t. c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} = Ai
for all i ∈ N′. It then follows from (4) that w({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t. c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩ W) =
w(∪i∈N′Ai ∩W) < b(N
′)L/n, and, yet, by (5) there exists a candidate
c∗ ∈ C′\{c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t. c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W = ∩i∈N′Ai\(∪i∈N′Ai ∩W)
such that w(c∗∪{c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t. c %i c
(i,|C′ |)}∩W) = w(c∗∪∪i∈N′Ai∩W) ≤ b(N
′)L/n.
That is, IPSC is violated.
(⇐) We prove the result via the contrapositive. Suppose that W is an outcome
such that IPSC does not hold. If W is not exhaustive, then (ii) is violated and we
are done. Now, suppose the W is exhaustive and does not satisfy IPSC. That is, W
is exhaustive, and there exists a set of voters N′ ⊆ N who solidly support a set of
candidates C′ with
w({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W) < b(N′)L/n (6)
and there exists some candidate c∗ ∈ C′ \ ({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W) such that
w(c∗ ∪ ({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W)) ≤ b(N′)L/n. (7)
First, suppose that, for some i ∈ N′,
{c : s.t. c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} , Ai.
This can only occur if |C′| > |Ai| or |Ai| = 0. In either case, this implies that {c :
s.t. c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} = C and
w(c∗ ∪ ({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W)) = w(c∗ ∪W) ≤ b(N′)L/n ≤ L
for some c∗ < W; but this contradicts the assumption that W is exhaustive. Thus, it
must be that
{c : s.t. c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} = Ai,
for all i ∈ N′. It then follows that
{c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} = ∪i∈N′Ai,
and, by (6),
w(∪i∈N′Ai ∩W) < b(N
′)L/n.
Further, the candidate subset C′ must correspond to a subset of
⋃
i∈N′ Ai. Thus, the
candidate c∗ ∈ (∩i∈N′Ai) \ (∪i∈N′Ai ∩W) and
w({c∗} ∪ (∪i∈N′Ai ∩W)) ≤ b(N
′)L/n.
Thus, condition (i) is violated. ⊓⊔
PBwith approval ballots has been considered by Aziz et al. (2018b). For example,
they proposed the following concept.
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Definition 6 (BPJR-L (Aziz et al., 2018b)) Assume that minc∈C w(c) = 1. A budget
W satisfies BPJR-L if for all ℓ ∈ [1, L] there exists no set of voters N′ ⊆ N with
|N′| ≥ ℓ n/L such that w
(
∩i∈N′ Ai
)
≥ ℓ and w
(
(∪i∈N′Ai) ∩W
)
< max
{
w(C′) : C′ ⊆
∩i∈N′Ai and w(C
′) ≤ |N′|L/n
}
.
In the restricted setting studied by Aziz et al. (2018b), CPSC for PB with approval
preferences is equivalent to the combination of the B-PJR-L and the maximal cost
concepts.1 B-PJR-L is weaker than CPSC because B-PJR-L does not imply maximal
cost.
Remark 1 In the standard multi-winner setting, outcomes are required to have max-
imal cost (and hence are exhaustive). Thus, condition (ii) in Proposition 4 and 5 are
always satisfied in the multi-winner setting.
IPSC for PB with approval preferences is stronger than the Local-BPJR-L pro-
posed by Aziz et al. (2018b).
Definition 7 (Local-BPJR-L (Aziz et al., 2018b).) A budget W satisfies Local-
BPJR-L if for all ℓ ∈ [1, L] there exists no set of voters N′ ⊆ N such that
W′ = (∪i∈N′Ai) ∩W, |N
′| ≥ ℓ n/L and there exists someW′′ ⊃ W′ such that
W′′ ∈ argmax
{
w(C′) : C′ ⊆ ∩i∈N′Ai and w(C
′) ≤ ℓ
}
.
4.3 Concepts with Strict Preferences
Below we rewrite the definitions for strict preferences. The definitions turn out to be
simpler compared to preferences that allow for ties.
Definition 8 (Comparative PSC (CPSC) for PB with strict preferences) Under
strict preferences, a candidate set W satisfies Comparative PSC (CPSC) if for all
solid coalitions N′ supporting candidate subset C′, if there exists some C′′ ⊆ C′ such
that w(C′′) ≤ Lb(N′)/n, then w(W ∩C′) ≥ w(C′′).
Definition 9 (Inclusion PSC for PB with strict preferences) Under strict prefer-
ences, a candidate set W satisfies local PSC if for all solid coalitions N′ supporting
candidate subset C′, there exists no subset C∗ ⊆ C′ such that C∗ ⊃ (C′ ∩ W) and
w(C∗) ≤
b(N′)
n
L.
5 Computing proportionally representative outcomes
Our first observation is that computing a CPSC outcome is computationally hard,
even for one voter.
Proposition 6 Computing a CPSC outcome is NP-hard even for the case of one voter.
1 The setting studied by Aziz et al. (2018b) normalizes the minimal-cost candidate to have unit cost and
the budget limit, L, is required to be a positive integer.
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Proof. Take an instance concerning one voter who approves of all candidates. Then,
due to Proposition 2, we know that outcome must contain the set of projects that
maximizes the total weight constrained to budget limit L. The problem is equivalent
to a knapsack problem and hence NP-hard. ⊓⊔
Next, we show that even for one voter with strict preferences, a CPSC outcome
may not exist.
Example 1 Consider the following PB instance with one voter and 4 candidate
projects. The voter’s preferences are as follows.
1 : a, b, c, d
The limit L is 4 and the weight are: w(a) = 3,w(b) = w(c) = w(d) = 2. CPSC requires
that a must be selected. It also requires that {b, c} should be selected. Therefore a
CPSC outcome does not exist.
Later, we will show that in a more restrictive setting (multi-winner approval vot-
ing) a CPSC outcome always exists, can be computed in computed in polynomial-
time, and coincides with a well-established proportional representation axiom, called
PJR. In fact, a CPSC outcome always exists in the PB setting if voters have dichoto-
mous preferences. This follows from the observation that, when voters have dichoto-
mous preferences, CPSC is equivalent to requiring that an outcome satisfy BPJR-L
and maximal cost, which is guaranteed to exist (Aziz et al., 2018b, Proposition 3.7).2
The lack of guarantee of existence of CPSC in the general PB settings versus multi-
winner voting demonstrates the challenges posed when moving from multi-winner
voting to PB.
In contrast to CPSC, we show that an IPSC outcome is not only guaranteed to
exist but it can be computed in polynomial time.
Proposition 7 PB-EAR satisfies Inclusion PSC for PB.
Proof. LetW be an outcome of PB-EAR. For sake of a contradiction, suppose thatW
does not satisfy Inc-PSC. That is, there exists a set of voters N′ who solidly support
a candidate set C′ such that
w(C¯′ ∩W) < b(N′)L/n,
where C¯′ := {c :∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)}, and there exists a candidate c∗ ∈ C′\(C¯′∩W)
such that
w
(
c∗ ∪ (C¯′ ∩W)
)
≤ b(N′)L/n. (8)
We will denote C¯′ ∩W byW′.
First, suppose the PB-EAR terminated at some j > |C′| iteration. At the end of
the j = |C′| iteration, the sum of voter weights in N′ is at least
b(N′) −
∑
c∈W′
w(c)n/L = b(N′) − w(W′)n/L.
2 It should be noted that the proof of Proposition 3.7 in Aziz et al. (2018b) requires a slight modification
to fit the more general PB setting studied in the present paper.
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Algorithm 1 PB Expanding Approvals Rule (PB-EAR)
Input: (N,C,%, b, L,w) {% can contain weak preferences; if a voter i expresses her
preferences over a subset C′ ⊂ C, then C \ C′ is considered the last equivalence
class of the voter.}
Output: W ⊆ C such that w(W) ≤ L.
1: j ←− 1
2: while w(W) < L and no other candidate can be added to W without exceeding
budget limit L do
3: for i ∈ N do
4: A
( j)
i
←− {c ∈ C : c %i c
(i, j)}
5: end for
6: C∗ ←− {c ∈ C\W :
∑
{i∈N : c∈A
( j)
i
}
bi ≥ n
w(c)
L
}
7: if C∗ = ∅ then
8: j ←− j + 1
9: else
10: Select a candidate c∗ from C∗
11: N′ ←− {i : c∗ ∈ A
( j)
i
}
12: Modify the weights of voters in N′ so the total weight of voters in N′, i.e.,∑
i∈N′ bi, decreases by exactly n
w(c)
L
.
13: end if
14: end while
15: return W
This follows because when each candidate is added to W a total weight of w(c)n/L
is subtracted from the set of voters supporting this candidate. Our lower bound is
attained by assuming that every candidate c ∈ W that can possibly reduce the weight
of voters in N′ (i.e., those candidates c ∈ c(i,|C
′ |) for i ∈ N′) subtracts the entire weight
w(c)/L from the voter set N′.
But (8) implies that w(W′) ≤ b(N′)L/n − w(c∗), and so
b(N′) −
∑
c∈W′
w(c)n/L ≥ w(c∗)n/L.
Thus, at the end of the j = |C′| iteration
∑
i∈N : c∗∈A
( j)
i
bi ≥ nw(c
∗)/L,
which implies that c∗ ∈ C∗ andC∗ , ∅. This is contradiction since no other candidates
from C¯′ are contained in W besides those already accounted for in W′, and so PB-
EAR could not have iterated to the j + 1-th stage.
Second, suppose that PB-EAR terminated at some j ≤ |C′| iteration. This can
only occur if w(W) < L and no candidate can be added without exceeding the budget
or w(W) = L. The total voter weight that has been subtracted (from all voters) via the
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algorithm is exactly
∑
c∈W
w(c)n/L = w(W)n/L. (9)
As noted in the above paragraphs, the voter weights of N′ is at least nw(c∗)/L. This
gives an upper bound on the total voter weight that has been decreased from all voters
n − nw(c∗)/L = [L − w(c∗)]n/L. (10)
Combining (9) and (10) gives
w(W)n/L ≤ [L − w(c∗)]n/L =⇒ w(W) ≤ L − w(c∗).
That is, w(W) + w(c∗) ≤ L. This is a contradiction since the set W does not equal L
and contains at least one candidate, namely c∗, such that W ∪ {c∗} does not exceed
L. ⊓⊔
Next we show that not all IPSC outcomes are possible outcomes of PB-EAR even
for the restricted setting of multi-winner voting.
Example 2 Suppose C = {w, x, y, z}, L = 2, bi ≡ 1,w(c) ≡ 1, n = 4 and approval
ballots
A1 = A2 = {w} A3 = {x} A4 = {x, y}.
The outcome W = {w, y} satisfies IPSC. However, it will never be an outcome of
PB-EAR. This follows because in the first iteration the support for candidate w and
x are equal to 2, candidate y receives support 1 and candidate z zero. The threshold
for consideration to be added into W is nw(c)/L = 2. Thus, only candidate w and x
can be considered. They are supported by disjoint sets of voters. Each must be added.
The unique PB-EAR outcome isW = {w, x}.
6 Special Focus on Multi-winner Voting
In the section, we dive into the well-studied setting of multi-winner voting which is
also referred to as committee voting. In this setting, k candidates are to be selected
from the set of candidates. We uncover some unexpected relations between fairness
concepts for this particular setting. We also show that whereas PSCS does not give
rise to a new fairness concept, IPSC gives to a new fairness concept even for the
setting concerning approval ballots.
Let us first introduce generalised PSC, which was proposed by Aziz and Lee
(2019) and applies to multi-winner settings with ordinal preferences.
Definition 10 (Generalised PSC (Aziz and Lee, 2019)) A committee W satisfies
generalised PSC if for every positive integer ℓ, and for all generalised solid coalitions
N′ supporting candidate subset C′ with size |N′| ≥ ℓn/k, there exists a set C∗ ⊆ W
with size at least min{ℓ, |C′|} such that for all c′′ ∈ C∗
∃i ∈ N′ : c′′ %i c
(i,|C′ |).
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Aziz and Lee (2019) showed that generalised PSC extends the PJR concept for
multi-winner voting with approval ballots.
Definition 11 (PJR) Suppose all voters have dichotomous preferences. A committee
W with |W | = k satisfies PJR for an approval ballot profile A = (A1, . . . , An) over a
candidate set C if for every positive integer ℓ ≤ k there does not exists a set of voters
N∗ ⊆ N with |N∗| ≥ ℓ n
k
such that
∣∣∣
⋂
i∈N∗
Ai
∣∣∣ ≥ ℓ but
∣∣∣(
⋃
i∈N∗
Ai
)
∩W
∣∣∣ < ℓ.
Let us first rewrite CPSC for the multi-winner voting setting.
Definition 12 (Comparative PSC (CPSC) for multi-winner voting ) A budget W
satisfies Comparative PSC (CPSC) if there exists no set of voters N′ ⊆ N such that
N′ solidly supports a set of candidates C′ such that there is a subset of candidates
C′′ ⊆ C′ such that |C′′| ≤ |N′|k/n but |{c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W | < |C′′|.
Proposition 8 For multi-winner voting, CPSC is equivalent to Generalised PSC.
Proof. Suppose W does not satisfy CPSC. Then, there exists a set of candidates C′
solidly supported by N′, for which there is some subset of candidates C′′ ⊆ C′ such
that |C′′| ≤ |N′|k/n but
|{c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W | < |C′′|. (11)
To show that generalised PSC does not hold, take ℓ = |C′′|, and notice that N′ is
a generalized solid coalition for C′ with |N′| ≥ |C′′|n/k = ℓn/k. We wish to show that
there is no subset C∗ ⊆ W of size at least min{ℓ, |C′|} = ℓ such that for all c′′ ∈ C∗
∃i ∈ N′ : c′′ %i c
(i,|C′ |)
.
If such a C∗ set did exist, then it must be that
|{c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W | ≥ |C∗| ≥ ℓ = |C′′|,
which contradicts (11). Therefore, no such set can exist and generalized PSC is vio-
lated.
Suppose W does not satisfy generalised PSC. Then, for some positive integer
ℓ, there exists a generalised solid coalition N′ supporting candidate subset C′ such
|N′| ≥ ℓn/k and there does not exist any subset C∗ ⊆ W : |C∗| ≥ min{ℓ, |C′|} such
that for all c′′ ∈ C∗
∃i ∈ N′ : c′′ %i c
(i,|C′ |)
.
This implies that
|{c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W | < min{ℓ, |C′|}. (12)
We now show that CPSC is violated. The set of voters N′ solidly supportsC′. Let
C′′ ⊆ C′ be any subset such that |C′′| = min{ℓ, |C′|}. It follows that |C′′| ≤ ℓ ≤ |N′|k/n.
However, from (12) we have
|{c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W | < min{ℓ, |C′|} = |C′′|,
which is a violation of CPSC. ⊓⊔
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Corollary 1 For multi-winner voting with approval ballot, CPSC, PJR, and PSC are
equivalent.
Proof. Aziz and Lee (2019) proved that for multi-winner voting with approval ballot
PJR and generalised PSC are equivalent.3 We have shown that for multi-winner vot-
ing, CPSC and generalised PSC are equivalent. ⊓⊔
As another corollary, we note that since testing PJR is coNP-complete (Aziz et al.,
2018a), testing, CPSC is coNP-complete.
Recall that CPSC appears to be a more demanding concept than IPSC because
computing a CPSC outcome is NP-hard and even existence is not established. Inter-
estingly, for multi-winner voting, IPSC is a stronger concept.
Proposition 9 For multi-winner voting, IPSC implies Generalised PSC (or CPSC)
Proof. Suppose W violates CPSC. Then, there exists a set of candidates C′ solidly
supported by N′, for which there is a subset of candidates C′′ ⊆ C′ such that |C′′| ≤
|N′|k/n but
|{c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W | < |C′′|. (13)
In the multi-winner setting, w(c) = 1 for all c ∈ C and so
|{c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W | ≤ |C′′| − 1.
Now let c∗ be some candidate c∗ ∈ C′′ \ ({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩ W), such a
candidate must exist by (13). But then
|c∗ ∪ ({c : ∃i ∈ N′ s.t c %i c
(i,|C′ |)} ∩W)| ≤ |C′′| ≤ |N′|k/n,
and IPSC is violated. Therefore in multi-winner voting, IPSC implies Generalised
PSC (or CPSC). ⊓⊔
Proposition 10 For multi-winner voting with approvals, IPSC implies PJR but PJR
does not imply IPSC.
Proof. Suppose a committeeW of size k does not satisfy PJR. Then, there exists a set
of voters N′ such that |N|k/n ≥ ℓ, ∩i∈N′Ai ≥ ℓ, and ∪i∈N′Ai < ℓ. But then there exists
a candidate c ∈ ∩i∈N′Ai \ (W ∩∪i∈N′Ai) such that |{c} ∪ (W ∩∪i∈N′Ai)| ≤ ℓ. Thus IPSC
is violated.
Next we show that PJR does not imply IPSC.
1 − 3 : {a, x}
4 − 6 : {a, y}
7, . . . , 12 : {u, v,w, x, y, z}
Consider outcome {u, v,w, x, y, z} for k = 6. Them consider the set N′ =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. PJR is not violated. But IPSC is violated. The example also shows
that even EJR (Aziz et al., 2017a) (a property stronger than PJR) does not imply
IPSC. ⊓⊔
3 The model in Aziz and Lee (2019) assumes that no voter is indifferent between all candidates. How-
ever, this assumption is not required to show the equivalence of PJR and generalised PSC.
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PB with PB with PB with Multi-winner Multi-winner Multi-winner with
Ordinal Prefs Approvals Strict Pref with Ordinal Prefs with Approvals Strict Prefs
CPSC PBJR-L(#) CPSC Generalized PSC(∗) PJR(∗) PSC(∗)
IPCS IPCS IPCS IPCS IPCS IPCS
Table 2 Equivalent Fairness concepts for social choice settings. The concepts and settings in bold are from
this paper. (∗) implies that, for the given social choice setting, the fairness concept is equivalent to CPSC.
(#) implies that, for the given social choice setting, the fairness concept combined with the maximal cost
property is equivalent to CPSC.
7 Conclusion
A formal study of PB from a (computational) social choice perspective is still in its
infancy. In this paper, we undertook a formal study of PB with ordinal preferences.
Previously, most of the focus was on approval ballots or cardinal utilities.
We propose two axioms (CPSC and IPSC) that capture important aspects of the
proportional representation. One of the concepts (IPSC) leads to a new concept even
for the restricted setting of multi-winner voting. Table 2 summarizes how some of the
concepts are equivalent to each other in particular settings.
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